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TEACHING CONFLICTS, IMPROVING
THE ODDS
Gene R. Shreve*
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS. By David
H. Vernon, Louise Weinberg, William L. Reynolds, and William M.
Richman. New York: Matthew Bender & Co. 1990. Pp. xxiii, 753,
and problem appendix. $39.95.

Before I first taught federal courts, I wrote to the late Professor
Paul Bator. I posed different possibilities for arranging assignments
from his casebook and asked for his advice concerning which he
thought would work best. His reply was gracious if brief. "Don't
worry about your particular approach." Professor Bator said.
"Whatever you do, the material is too rich to spoil."
The same can be said for conflicts. One of the few common law
courses in the upper curriculum, it invites more attention to themes of
judicial lawmaking and process than courses after the first year usually
do. Moreover, the topics addressed in conflicts are as challenging intellectually as a law teacher could want. They continually provide opportunities to question the "what" and "why" of law. Finally,
professors have a hook to use in teaching conflicts that is not always
available in highly conceptual courses. Conflicts problems inescapable
in practice are really no different from those in the classroom. In perhaps no other law school course do spheres of intellectualism (dear to
the legal academy) and practical understanding (dear to lawyers and
judges) so overlap.
Since this makes conflicts too rich to spoil, any good casebook
should do, and there have long been many good ones on the market.
It is fair to ask whether we need another. Professors David Vernon,'
Louise Weinberg, 2 William Reynolds, 3 and William Richman 4
thought so. This essay examines their book and agrees.
Part I discusses why conflicts, despite its allure, can be so frustrating to teach. Part II discusses features of the new casebook. It concludes that, while the new book does not represent a dramatic
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departure from its competitors, its assorted qualities add up to an attractive package: materials that may help conflicts professors involve
and truly teach a higher proportion of their students.

I. SOME REASONS CONFLICTS IS A DIFFICULT COURSE To
TEACH

To understand why conflicts is hard to teach successfully, it may
be best to begin with a closer look at the core of the course: the
choice-of-law process. That process exists for cases in which the facts
suggest two or more different sources for governing law, and laws
from those sources seem to produce conflicting results.5 A full-bodied
approach to resolving conflicts emerged from American judicial decisions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This traditional
approach entered a period of stagnation, followed by what has often
6
been called a revolution in conflicts doctrine.
Torts and contracts cases provided the stage for most of the struggle. The shape of dramatic change in American conflicts law was clear
in the early 1970s. Local litigants began to win application of forum
law by arguing that they were among those whom such law was
designed to protect. In other words, they demonstrated that the forum had a legitimate interest in having its own law applied to the controversy. 7 These decisions were sensible. However, because they
rejected a good deal of traditional conflicts doctrine, the decisions
were revolutionary as well.
Traditional doctrine had usually been indifferent to the purposes of
laws or to particular needs of litigants. It rested instead upon an increasingly unconvincing jurisprudence, a vested-rights formalism similar in its way to jurisdictional doctrine most often associated with
Pennoyer v. Neff. 8 Geographical inquiries dominated both fields. For
Pennoyer the question was whether service of process was completed
(as it had to be) in the forum state. Under traditional conflicts doc5. This essay uses the phrases conflict of laws and choice of laws interchangeably to describe
such issues. On the roots of the first term, see Donald T. Trautman, The Relation Between
American Choice of Law and FederalCommon Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 1977, at
105, 105 n.2, and of the second, see David F. Cavers, A Critiqueof the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARV. L. REv. 173, 179 (1933).
6. Examples of the many descriptions of the modem movement and its effect on traditional
doctrine include David F. Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 131
R.C.A.D.I. 75 (1970), and Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83
COLUM. L. RaV. 772 (1983).
7. While sharp local interests precipitated the revolution, the idea of inquiring into the policies accounting for a rule of decision was not parochial in itself. It is not surprising, therefore,
that courts soon began to use interest (policy) analysis to choose foreign over local law. For
discussion of several of these cases, see Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense ofInterestAnalysis in the
Conflict of Laws and the Use of that Analysis in ProductsLiability Cases, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 493,

499-501 (1985).

8. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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trine, the choice of law was governed by such facts as the location of
physical injury or the place of contracting. For some time, courts had
mitigated the harshness of-traditional conflicts doctrine through different fictions. Yet these fictions - distasteful in themselves - offered
unreliable protection. 9
Pennoyer's dominance ended when the Supreme Court began permitting personal jurisdiction in forums where service of process could
not be completed. 10 The conflicts revolution came only a short time
later, when a significant number of courts decided that geographical
indicators such as place of physical injury or place of contracting
would not necessarily dictate the source of governing law.II As with
the modification of personal jurisdiction rules, changes in choice of
law doctrine reflected a shift from hard-and-fast rules to approaches
that were far-ranging, supple, and policy-based.
Old geographical indicators lost their preeminence, but they did
not disappear under modern theory. Courts retained them while adding others. New indicators in torts and contracts cases included
places where the parties were citizens, and where relationships material to the controversy were centered.1 2 Working with more indicators, courts began using a mode of analysis unthinkable under
traditional doctrine. They applied in the same case geographical indicators pointing both toward and away from a source of governing
law.
For traditionalist courts, a single geographical indicator decided
the case. Under modern theory, however, a single indicator is but part
of a larger net of geographical indicators used to gather data - raw
facts from each case. No indicator is invariably significant. The same
one (for example, plaintiff's place of citizenship) might illuminate data
instrumental to decision in one case but not in the text.
The different role modern theory assigns to geographical indicators
reflects a more profound division between the two approaches. Little
of what we now think of as conflicts policy accompanied the traditional approach. Geographical indicators instead operated in a closed,
mechanical system characteristic of deus ex machina formalism. In
9. See Joseph Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Substance, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1027,
1056-62 (1949); Monrad G. Paulson & Michael Sovern, "PublicPolicy" in the Conflict of Laws,
56 COLUM. L. REv. 969, 970-71 (1956).

10. The pivotal case was International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a
description of this period in the history of personal jurisdiction, see GENE R. SHREVE & PETER
RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 38-50 (1989).
11. Two watershed decisions were Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954) (contracts),
and Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) (torts).
12. For example, § 145(2) the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLiCr OF LAWS (1971) offers these indicators for torts cases in general: "(a) the place where the
injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered."
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contrast, modem theory exhibits a preference for policy-driven rather
than fact-driven results. The essence of the modem approach is that a
raw geographical fact weighs in the balance of a conflicts decision only

when it implicates an important choice-of-law policy.
Modernists take their policies from shared goals of the choice-oflaw process. Chief among these are the goals of giving rules of decision the effects intended by the sovereigns that created them and respecting the reasonable expectations of the parties. If one engages in
this process of data collection and evaluation- carefully, it becomes
clear in many cases that only one choice promotes goals of choice of
law, and the modem approach is relatively easy to justify. The approach is also useful for difficult cases, because it reveals the clash of
choice-of-law goals that produces difficulties, and it gives courts as
much to work with as possible in reaching a decision.

Some commentators have been more enthusiastic than others

about these developments. 13 Yet two points seem clear. First, few

would turn back the clock. Second, the revolution has made conflicts

never an easy subject 14 - more complex, elusive, and downright
difficult. 15 Except in a handful of jurisdictions still using the old approach,1 6 results now turn on particular and highly variable features
-

of each case.
Appropriately, then, students in law school conflicts classes are
likely to spend much time carefully unraveling decisions and hypotheticals. This is case method teaching of a demanding sort. For
13. Compare Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Function and the Basis of Regulatory
Interests Under FunctionalChoice-of-Law Theory: The Significance ofBenefit and the Insignificance ofIntention, 65 VA. L. REv. 1063 (1979); John Bernard Corr, InterestAnalysis and Choice
ofLaw: The DubiousDominance of Domicil, 1983 UTAH L. REV.651; John Hart Ely, Choice of
Law and the State'sInterestin ProtectingIts Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981); William
C. Powers, Jr., Formalismand Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REv.
27 (1976) (each expressing apprehension) with Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: InterestAnalysis
andIts "New Critics," 36 AM. J. CoMP. L. 681 (1988); Robert A. Sedler, InterestAnalysis as the
PreferredApproach to Choice of Law: A Response to Professor Brilmayer's "FoundationalAttack, "46 OHIO ST. L.J. 483 (1985); David E. Seidelson, InterestAnalysis: The Questfor Perfection and the FrailtiesofMan, 19 DUQ. L. REv. 207 (1981) (each viewing modern developments
more favorably).
14. It was to Cardozo "one of the most baffling subjects of legal science." BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 67 (1928). Professor Max Rheinstein later
described the traditional approach as the "most difficult and most confused of all branches of the
law." Max Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 632, 655 (1962) (book
review).
15. By one stern assessment, "the antics ofjoyriding conflicts revolutionaries have done little
to improve the image of our discipline." Friedrich K. Juenger, What Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.

509, 515 (1985).
16. At one time, it seemed that all remaining jurisdictions would fall into line. In two jurisdictions, however, traditional conflicts doctrine recently exhibited surprising fife. Owen v. Owen,
444 N.W.2d 710 (S.D. 1989); Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986). For critiques
of Owen and Paul, respectively, see Charles M. Thatcher, Choice of Law in Multi-State Tort
Actions After Owen v. Owen: The Less Things Change.... 35 S.D. L. REv. 372 (1990); and
Jeffrey Jackson, No PlaceLike Home Public Policy and PrudentPracticein the Conflict of Laws,
90 W. VA. L. Rv.1195 (1988).
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the approach to be successful, students must prepare, attend class, and

actively (or vicariously) participate. 17 This is also where difficulties in
conflicts teaching begin.

Up to a point, the difficulties encountered are typical of those
professors face in most second- and third-year courses. Law professors usually find it much harder to sustain the interest of students who
are beyond their first year of law school.18 For several reasons, however, the picture is more discouraging for conflicts.
While evidence of merely mediocre work in law school is never

heartening, it is little short of horrifying in a conflicts course. Modem
conflicts analysis is so demanding that a superficial "C" level understanding of conflicts is probably close to useless. Those in practice

must have a mastery of the conceptual techniques to avoid fouling up
even simple conflicts problems. The prospect of unleashing more "C"
conflicts students on society takes a lot of the pleasure out of teaching
the course.
Mastery of the subject is possible for most students only through
careful reading, hard thought, and repetition of difficult mental exercises - effort disaffected second- and third-year students may be unwilling to make. Conflicts students often display cynicism about the

class material and about the manner in which it is taught. That is,
they dismiss conflicts decisions as unprincipled instead of attempting

to understand subtle forces of conflicts policy and the common law
process, and they mistake as redundant the variations posed in
method-based conflicts teaching.1 9

Thus, conflicts students often slip through the course without really understanding the subject. Much of this would probably occur
even if conflicts received a pro rata share of the dwindling commit-

ment of upper-year students. Unfortunately, it may receive less. Because conflicts course work often involves the repetition of outwardly

similar mental exercises instead of the information crunching charac17. On the strategies and difficulties of case method teaching, see Lon L. Fuller, On Teaching
Law, 3 STAN. L. REv. 35 (1950); Edwin W. Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal
Education: Its Originsand Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1951).
18. Upperclass students are prone to "[c]ycles of extended periods of lethargy followed by
bouts of cramming. During the second and third years of law study, student effort declines and
disbelief in [the] value of the standard techniques and expectations of legal education increases."
TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS 17 (1979).

19. Some readers might wonder whether there is not a rather obvious solution to the problem: make the final examination for conflicts so difficult that only students who truly grasp the
subject will pass. The proposal has a certain appeal, but is unrealistic for most law schools today.
Many use guidelines for grade distribution. These discourage or eliminate discretion to enlarge
grade categories, particularly extreme categories like "F' or "D." As a more basic matter, such
low marks are in these times of grade inflation rarely given at all. A professor who gave a
conspicuously large number of low grades could expect enrollment for the course to plummet
thereafter. Good students would be among those frightened away.
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teristic of many other upper-curriculum courses, 20 students may be
correct when they perceive that less work is required to achieve academic mediocrity in the former.
This unsentimental picture of conflicts teaching accepts as cold
truth that many students may start the course comfortable with the
prospect of doing the bare minimum, and that such meager effort is
likely to produce little conflicts learning. However, while some view
problems of this sort as nearly unsolvable, 2 1 matters are not that bleak.
I have explained elsewhere why few law students are genuinely beyond
hope. 22 Those arguments bear on concerns raised in this essay and can
be summarized as follows.
For most upper-year students, the fear and mystery of law school
are gone. They know they will graduate whether or not they push
themselves in their courses. But this does not mean that they clearly
will not work, only that they realize they have a choice. If they feel
poorly treated, or simply taken for granted, they may exercise their
independence in ways disagreeable to their professors and destructive
to their own learning opportunities.
The idea then - particularly for a course as difficult to teach as
conflicts - is to draw a greater proportion of students into the richness of the material. Conflicts may be too rich to spoil, but it does not
teach itself. To improve the odds in the sense of reaching more students requires of conflicts professors an especially large amount of
hard work and dogged enthusiasm. We need every edge we can get.
The Vernon, Weinberg, Reynolds, and Richman casebook seems to
offer one.

20. There is no need to suggest that other courses are less challenging intellectually than
conflicts. The point is that many are much more likely than conflicts to require students constantly to absorb new, relatively technical categories of material. The difference is evident, for
example, from a comparison of conflicts with a course on the Uniform Commercial Code. On
the latter, see Edward A. Laing, Book Review, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249 (1979) (reviewing DAVID
G. EPSTEIN & JAMES A. MARTn., BASIC UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE -

TEACHING MATER-

IALS (1977)); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, Book Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDuC. 433 (1986) (reviewing
JONATHAN A. EDDY & PETER WINSHIP, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: TEXT, CASES, AND
PROBLEMS (1985)).

21. Resentment toward students who feel no obligation to work hard is widespread among
law professors and has led to a number of hostile portraits. See, ag., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, LAW,
INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION 73 (1979); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at 278 (1983); Anthony D'Amato, The Decline andFallof Law Teaching in the Age ofStudent Consumerism, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461, 475
(1987).
22. Gene R. Shreve, History of Legal Education, 97 HARV. L. REV. 597, 604-05 (1983) (reviewing STEVENS, supra note 21); Gene R. Shreve, Book Review, 33 VAND. L. REV. 822, 825-33
(1980) (reviewing ALLEN, supra note 21); Gene R. Shreve, Book Review, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
259, 265-68 (1978) (reviewing THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW
STUDENTS AND PEOPLE (1977)).
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FEATURES OF THE NEW CASEBOOK

The authors have previously done fine individual work.23 Two
combined on an important conflicts treatise. 24 Now they demonstrate
their ability to assemble course materials in a way that both recognizes
the sophistication and vitality of their subject and supports conflicts
teachers in meeting the challenge we have been considering.
As one would expect from such a seasoned group of collaborators,
there is nothing indecisive in the design or content of their book. Topics the authors choose to address, 25 they address thoroughly and quite
well, effectively combining cases, text, and problems. The fairly bold
tradeoffs found in this casebook may be most appealing to professors
who come to conflicts from federal courts and civil procedure backgrounds. For example, the treatments of personal jurisdiction (also in
civil procedure) and federal/state conflict of laws (also in federal
courts) appear in all conflicts casebooks currently in use, but are
among the best here. On the other hand, professors coming to conflicts from an international law background may prefer a book giving
greater emphasis to that side of the subject. 2 6 Or professors with an
interest in corporations, estate planning, or some other area may prefer a book giving greater attention to these and other substantive
fields.27
For teachers such as myself who do not stray far beyond the core
of the subject, the book should be a delight. Undoubtedly all the authors contributed to the portions of the book treating the choice-of-law
process; yet Louise Weinberg's influence seems particularly evident
here. 28 Professor Weinberg recently chaired the conflict of laws section of the Association of American Law Schools. With many others,
I have long admired her scholarship on choice of law itself, on choice
of law and the Constitution, and on related matters concerning the
intersection of state and federal law. Of those who have edited
23. Se ag., Louise Weinberg, Choice ofLaw and MinimalScrutiny,49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440
(1982).
24. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1984). Another edited an earlier casebook. DAVID H. VERNON, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1982).
25. The book covers all of the basic topics of a conflicts course: domicile (ch. 2); jurisdiction
(ch. 3); choice of law (ch. 4); The Constitution and the choice of law (ch. 5); federal/state conflict
of laws (ch. 6); and judgments (ch. 75. These topics are presented in a manner that makes them
more or less interchangeable. This is important, for every conflicts professor has his or her own
idea concerning the order in which the topics should be taught.
26. Eg., WILLIS L.M. REESE, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (9th
ed. 1990); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1986).

27. See, ag., ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 1989); GARY J. SIMSON, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT OF
LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1991). True to form, the one substantive area the new
casebook does treat ("Domestic Relations," ch. 8) it addresses in commendable detail.
28. Professor Weinberg confirmed this in a letter to the author, dated November 25, 1991.
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casebooks, she ranks with Lea Brilmayer, 29 Russell Weintraub, 30
David Currie, 3 1 Arthur von Mehren, and Donald Trautman3 2 in exploring the choice-of-law process from so many angles.
A source of student resistance to conflicts has been that many of
the cases most important in the evolution of modem doctrine dealt
with substantive issues now archaic (such as guest statutes, wrongful
death liability, and married women's contracts). The new casebook
confronts this problem by balancing formative with contemporary
cases. Thus, although it contains many hardy perennials from the
classical and revolutionary periods,3 3 it also pursues conflicts issues in
34
more contemporary settings.

I am also very impressed with the commentary following the cases.

It is engaging, nicely written material that pushes students to think
about what they have read and supplies numerous ideas and sources
for further reading. All of this should be of real help in overcoming
the difficulties in drawing students into the course. So too will diagrams 35 and abundant problems 36 found in the casebook. Students are
29. LEA BRILMAYER & JAMES A. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES AND MATERIALS
(3d ed. 1990).
30. EUGENE F. SCOLES & RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS (2d ed. 1972).
31. ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES - COMMENTS - QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1987).
32. ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1965).
33. Among the former are Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala.
1892), reprintedat pp. 219-21, and Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878), reprinted at pp. 22527. The latter include Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954), reprintedat p. 293; Babcock
v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963), reprinted at pp. 309-12; Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395
P.2d 543 (Or. 1964), reprintedat pp. 321-26; and Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal.
1976), reprintedat pp. 343-47.
34. For example, product liability and mass tort cases are quite important now. See, eg.,
Symposium, ConflictofLaws and Complex Litigation Issues in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL.
L. REv. 35; Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REv. LrrsG. 309 (1991). Among the cases from this area appearing in the
casebook are Edwardsville National Bank & Trust Co. v. Marion Laboratories, Inc., 808 F.2d
648 (7th Cir. 1987), reprintedat pp. 381-83 (product liability); Perkins v. Clark Equipment Co.,
823 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1987), reprintedat pp. 405-07 (product liability); and In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), reprintedat pp. 565-76
(mass tort).
35. For example, a diagram at p. 307 separates strands of law, policy, and interest-generating
facts found in the famous case of Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803
(Ala. 1892) reprinted at pp. 219-21. Students should find this technique quite helpful. It is
reminiscent of some of the authors' earlier work. See eg., William Richman, Diagramming
Conflicts: A Graphic Understandingof InterestAnalysis, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 317 (1982); RiCHMAN
& REYNOLDS, supra note 24, at 178-96.
36. The end of the book contains about 125 pages of short problems. They look good and are
perhaps more numerous than those found in any other casebook. It is wrong, however, for
professors to be left as much in the dark about these problems as their students. As their creator,
see p. vii, Professor Vernon must have in mind certain uses for and answers to the problems.
Perhaps he will eventually prepare a manual sharing that information with those who adopt his
book.
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likely to welcome periodic assignments from this problem set as a res37
pite from case method work.

Scholarship on choice of law is full of controversy, and the literature (including some casebooks) can be quite doctrinaire. I was
pleased, then, to discover that this book did not attempt to foreclose

discussion in controversial areas. 38 The same holds true for the later

portion of the book dealing with choice of law and the Constitution.

The book faced a great challenge here. "I think it difficult to point to
any field," wrote Justice Jackson, "in which the Court has more com-

pletely demonstrated or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding
standards of a legal character than in trying to determine what choice
'39
of law is required by the Constitution.

The picture has not improved. During the past decade, numerous
commentators have dissected tangled Supreme Court opinions. The

new casebook lays open the possibilities. It focuses on the Full Faith
and Credit and Due Process Clauses, traditional inspirations for regu-

lating choice of law. 40 The book also considers how other parts of the
Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause, might apply to regulate

choice of law (pp. 448-59).
A new casebook offers a certain advantage for those teaching any
course for the first time, since the material should be fresh, complete,

and located in just one book with no supplement. This holds true for
the Vernon, Weinberg, Reynolds, and Richman casebook. With it,

37. While it is doubtful whether the problem method should be the primary teaching mode
for conflicts, it seems clear that students respond positively to problem intervals in case method
teaching - particularly upper-year students. For general discussion of the problem method, see
Gregory L. Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 654 (1984).
On the peculiar advantages of problem assignments in a conflicts course, see Gene R. Shreve,
Bringing the EducationalReforms of the Cramton Report into the Case Method Classroom Two Models 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 793, 802-06 (1981).
38. For example, the discussion that I take to be by Professor Weinberg of the "anti-modern.
ist" position (pp. 384-85) is informative and respectful, even though that position is at odds with
her own view. For the latter, see Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law Applied:
Overhauling ConstitutionalTheory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67 (1988).
39. Robert H. Jackson, FullFaith and Credit - The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16 (1945).
40. Kg., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816-817 (1985). Views differ concerning the extent to
which these clauses warrant intervention into the choice-of-law process. Compare James R.
Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry About FullFaith and Credit to Laws, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1299
(1987) (arguing for the development of extensive regulatory doctrine); Terry S. Kogan, Toward a
Jurisprudenceof Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairnessover Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651
(1987) (same) with Gene R. Shreve, In Search of Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard - Reflections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REv. 327 (1982) (arguing that the full
faith and credit and due process clauses should continue to play only a minor role); Gene R.
Shreve, InterestAnalysis as ConstitutionalLaw, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 51 (1987) (same).
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and with the fine reference materials41 and mind-stretching articles42

that exist for the subject, first-time conflicts professors should have the
help they need.
For experienced conflicts professors, the prospect of adopting this
book may carry an added complication. To break in a different
casebook costs valuable time and effort, and it usually causes the professor a small but disagreeable amount of classroom fumbling. This is
why, as many disappointed publishers' representatives will attest, I
hate to change casebooks. For conflicts, I have used successive edi-

tions of the same book since 1975. It is a measure of my regard for the
Vernon, Weinberg, Reynolds, and Richman book that I switched to it
this past fall. This essay has sketched some of the reasons for that
decision. In short, this casebook is too attractive to pass up.

41. Standard texts include ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (4th
ed. 1986); RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 24; EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1982); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(2d ed. 1980). For an excellent recent survey, see P. John Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides,
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